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THE PHILOSOPHY OF CODE PLEADING*
The first steps in the path of civilization
are the formation of a system of law and its use in
litigation* When this step is taken jurisprudence has
its birth. In its beginngs it is
factory,it

crude and unsatis-

is narrow;r and inflexible but later in its

development it becomes a science.

It is called into

being by the wants of society and,having at its

found-

ation the principaJs of justicethe -hilosophy of
human law must eventuilly come to the surface.
it does come to the surface,then it is

WThen

that juris -

prudence as an agent and a science becomes a

potent

servant of abstract justice and the legal and more.l
rules become more in unison, litigation,t is true,is
an evil and a burden upon society,but it is an evil
which must be born as a refuge from greater ones.
The first step in litigation is the pleading.
During the earliest period of the development of the
Roman laTr of which there can be found any traces,and
for a long time subsequent to the decemviral legislation known as the Twelve Tablos,the-ne

.-ire

fivetactions"

by w:hich all

civil rights c.uld be maintained.

we-e arbitrary and necessaril/

narrow in

They

their appli-

cation.Persons desiring to tahle advantage of these remedies must perform various acts,repeat certain formal phrases and make all of the
necessary to bring before the

symbolic gest reswcourt

the subject of

the litigation. These regulations were construed strictly and a party omitting to perform the requirements
was driven from court and his case failed. The five
Roman actions were as follovs. Ist. Action by means of
a .ager. This was the oldest action and seems to have
been in most general use. In this action the plaintiff
brought the property claimed into court and wy holding
a rod over it claimed it. The defendant then did the
same.The plaintiff then offered to wager and his offer
was then accepted. The court then decided the wager. 2nd.
4.

Act4#k by demanding a Judex. In this case the Judex
took the place of our jury and might be called a jury
man. But little is known of this action

but it is

thought that it was used where there -:,,as a dispute
as to the terms of an actual contract. 3rd.Action by
notice,wherein the plaintiff served a summons upon the
defendant to appear within thirty days.

This action

was used whenever the terms of the contract were certain

and the onlv dispute was as to its performance. 4th. Action by arrestwhich was

a proceeding by whicih the de-

fendant was arrested and brought into court. It is

sup-

posed to have been a sort of a body execution. 5th.Action
by taking pledge. This was also an execution,being used
against property.
The object of actions wais to place within the
reach of the people modes whereby they might enforce rights
and redress wrongs. This object was not gained by the
technical practice under the five forms of actions. A
system containing so little philosophy must necessarily
give way to a more liberal method where a nation is constantly in % process of development.
The Formula is the generic name given to the
system which followed. In this system we fin. the first
trace of the modern idea of pleading. Under this method
the parties came before the Praeter and made oral pleadings,which were taken &owj Oy the court.After the pleadings were drawn the facts were tried before a

[uJ'<ex.

New

formulae were adopted from time to time and the old ones
were extended. There was however another system of pleading gradally inserting itsgelf into Roman practice at
this time. This system was that
extiQrdinary jurisdiction of the

which by virtue of the
praetor enabled hin

to

try both the law and the fact. This became gradually enlarged until it assumed r~eortions as our modern court

Passing from the practice of thei early Ro;ans let us
Cxamine for a moment the methods- of the English legists
under their first systematic

pract~ice.Here as in Rome

the differgnt modes of proceeding in the redress of wrongs,
are known in the law as

They were divided into

£1actions.

"formed actions" and "actions on the case" The first
divis~ion are of the greater antiquity. They were certain
defined formes,each designed for

some particular wrong.

The latter class was more extended and applied to classes of wrongs.
Pleadings in

the English cornmon law act-

ions comprise all the alldgations during the course of
the action. The object of pleading ispto ascertain by a
process of alligations and denialsthe matters really in
controvery,to give the parties

notice of the case which

they will be compelled to pros'cute or defend and the
speedy settlement of the cause. It is necessary that they
should be in writing in order to avoid departure from
the pleadings,which would cause endless altercation
All pleadings ever devised requiring a statement of the
facts constituting the cause of action or the defence,
imply a proposition of la,-.

Issues miry be tendered eith-

er upon the truth of the facts or upon the truth of the
proposition of law. The issue of fact is tender-id by a
denial called

The issue of law is

tendered by a denial called a demurrer

The plaintiff first states the facts constituting his cause of action.

It is then necessary

the defendant to file his answer,

for

he may allege that

the

matters set forth in the declaration do not constitute a
cause of action.

This is a demurrer.

He may deny the

truth of all the matters alleged,which is known as pleading the general issue* He may deny part of the facts set
forth44A

in the declarationor he may set up new matte'r

as a defence.

This is

called special pleeding.

The de-

murrer closes the altercation by bringing the case at once
to an issue 72.t
law. The issue of law is whether upon the
whole matter as declaredwhen admitted to be true, the
plaintiff is entitled to recover. That is , when we admit
the truth of the all~gations,by dermrring, we deny the
conclusions of law which the pleader

drawrs from the same

allegations of fact. If on the other hand the defendant
wished to deny the truth of the "facts" alleged, he filed
a plea called a traverse.

By means of this plea the party

could deny the whole matter set forth, or he might deny
any part of it. Again if the party wishod and the circumstances required, he could admit the the al3Agations
of his oppon yit to be true aird set up new matter as a defence.Theroupon

his opporent would

file a traverse and

deny the alltgations averred in the plea. The matters
thus

alleged and denied constituted the issue and it

was to try this issue that the jury .as

called,

In this

manner there might be several pleadings served by each
party before x an issue was reached. When a party alleged
a matter which his opponent wished to deny and that
alltgation was denied,

the

iszue was determined and the

cause ready for trial.
The. system

;hich prevailed in the later iJquity

courts was much the same-It contained the same feature
of numerous pleadings but dispensed with the fictitious
all4gations used to

make the

actions in law to conform

with the origifnal actions. The old features which were
discarded were the teciical requirements so peculiar to
primitive peoples. The philosophy of pleading was asserti-pg its~elf with the advance of human thought. It is
often asserted that this system is the only true foundation upon which to build a perfect system of pleading.
In reducing the issue to a small campass this is certainly true, and in the hands of learned lawyers it may be so
:±n all

respects.
When the first New York code was issued it

containe.

the followinf provisqion,."The distinctions a6

tax between

actions at law and suits in equity and the

formis of all such actions and suits heretofore existing
are abolished and,.shall be in this state but one form of
action for enforcement and protection of private rights
and the redress of private wrongs,which shall be denom-

inated a civil actions. It might seem that by this stieeping provission, the New York legislature had ,by

a

single

blow,ar.ihilated the whole system of ancient English remedies. This however would be a mistaken conception. The
common law and equity systems

founded upon a deep

Were

seated and stable philosophy which xxx ,vere not

discard-

ed by this legislation. The old forms were abolished but
the old causes of action were still in existgnce4 We
have in the place of a nimaber of pleadings a single one
but this single one must set forth ali

the facts consti-

tuting the plaintiffs cause of actionhence it mus.t contain al)of the st:tements found in all of the pleadings
in the old system.

The answer is to set forth the whole

defence of the defendant and therefore contains all* of
the allegations which woul,
ings in

the early systcm.The

be found in

the many plead-

same result is

reached as

by the use of the old system. The only exception to this
rule is

where a reply is used.

certain

or all

The defendant denies

the allegations

thereby forms an issuea system of pleading.

This is
It

is

in

the coplaint and

the cardinal purpose of

necessary

to define the issue

and bring before the juc.e or jury the point to be xecided.

Those who lament that th-

on law pleadi,7 is
in.- see

1

abolishediy

entire syoten- of coynthis

new syst

of plead-

to confound t] e forum of thle act ion -,7ith the cc-ase

of action. Form is

not substance.

P1eilier are t e piead-

if-,

oP fi

Hv

r
a "v

'J1r r~

one great ai

to -'(ducp

of the rule raking

all th'i? facts

it

nea es'-

in issue betw en the part-

ies to writing is to bring before the court the real and
true matters in dispute.

This purpose

is attained by

requiring each party to state fully and accurately all
of the facts upon which they rely and by requiring their
denial to be truthfully made in detail. By requiring the
pleadings to be sworn to ,the courts do not permit either
party to allege any fact which is not true or which at
least he does not believe to be true,or to deny
trovert any allegation which he knows to be true.

or conIt was

boasted that the coTynon law system of pleading was arrainged to accomplish this very purpose .But a comparison
of it with the later systems shows that the contrary
must be true.

All manner of false statements were alwiays

allowed and frequently actually required. This necessarily
would often work

injustice. The real chriacter of a part-

y 4's cause of action or defence could be and often woS;
concealed behind a fiction.

The party was not in fact

given notice of the action brought against him. It is
sometimes said that the party would know of the cause or
claim of his opponant and therefore would practically
have notice. But the very purp'ose of a pleading is to
give the opposing party actual notice and if we are to rely upon his personal kno :;ledge why then have any more

than the summons. This objection it is true has been
greatfly r6duced by the reformi of the equity system. Nevertheless it is also true that there is still room for
improvement in this systmi,if we look at it from the
standpoint of one accustomed to code pleading>
There is in the comon law system a distinction
between two classes of facts which i;Aunknown to the
later method.That is the distinction between the inducement and the cause of action proper." Inducement

and"gist

are conmon terms in the old system of pleading. This
distinction however does not portain to form only but to
the actual substance of the action. In the older systenm
inducement often consisted
the means by which it is

of a fiction.

This is not

used in the later system. Here

it is used only when necessary to complete the parties
cause of action. It consists of extrinsic facts which
show the right of the particular person to bring the action or to answer,or the particular liability of the defendant,where these matters are not set forth in the

al-

ltgations showing the injury or defence* An exanple of
this would be an allegation setting forth title, encorporat ion,&c.
A contract or legal instrument should be stated according to its legal effect.(I Chitty on Pleading 312)%

This rule applies to all matters and instruments-.A party
is often tempted to set forth an instrument or other
facts in an untrue light. This rule compelis the party
to allege the contract in its exact words

or to al-lege

it according to its exact and precise legal effect*.
Uncler the new practice the plaintiff may unite in
the same complaint several causes of action either legal or
equitable or both. They must however arise out of the
same transaction or transactions connected with the same
cause of action and must be of the same nature. It is
improper to join with an action for slander a count

set-

ting up a cause of action upon breach of contract. The
causes of action which may be properly joined in the same
complaint may be found in all codes of procedure.
Code Civ. Pro.44

(NYv

)

An action has been defined as a proceeding for
the redress or prevention of wrong. The cause of action
then must be the wrong itstelf.The facts set forth in
the pleading show the wrong and if there is no wrong
shown then the complaint is defective as not showing
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This m
may not be always in a neglect to allege allof the unlawful acts performed by the defendant. You may allege
all of the acts constituting trespass ,but if the plain-

tiff neglects to set forth title hc has failed to make
out a cause of action.

The court frequently gives more

than one kind of relief for one wrong. The defendant
may owe a debt and it may also be secured by a mortgage.
A failure to pay this howeverwould constitute only a
single wrong. The plaintiff may sue on the debt or he
may foreclose the mortgage. The only

way in which to

ascertain the precige cause of action is to take each
supposed cause of action4 and see if* taken alone it
states facts sufficient for recovery and then compare
the two and see if they have any common important facts.
If so they can be said to constitute a single cause of
action

The reason for any rule limiting an action to

causes which are practically of the same nature
ably founded upo: a lack of confidence in

is prob-

the ability

of the average human mind to solve difficult or intricate
questions. It is simply a rule insisting upom simple
trials of fact when they must necessarily come before an
alerage jury of uninte~igent men. Another application
of what is practically the same rule is that not only
must the cause of action
ies but must
cannot be sued

wAo

be between the same part-

be concerning the same right. A defendant
individually and in the same action in

a representative capacity.
In discussing the foregoing rules ,e find that

our present jury system figures promingntly in the philosophy of our modern code pleading as well as in the
older ie.hods. Experitnce has taught us that an ordinary
jut'y is not composed of ordinary men and tlie

systcn of

pleading and in fact our whole practice must be shaped
in order to permit us to retain in our systerr.
feature of

that

which the only peculiarity and distinctive

characteristic

is ignorance and inability to decide the

ordinary cases which would come before

them were

it not

for the provisions for their benefit .
It is also provided that the causes of action
must arise from the same transaction. "Transaction" is a
and any acts or omissions be-

term including contracts

tweeiA the parties that may become the foundation of an
action.It is difficult to define accurately this word
derived from

trans a

seems,often finds

.

The practicting attorney,it

it difficult to avoid dividing up

his cause of action

because his cause of action con-

gists of several items or parts or because he wishes to
demand more than one kind of relief. The other error
to be avoided
action

is the uniting of two or more causes of

in one because they are in some way

connected.

All of these errors grow out of a mispconception of of
the precise wrong which is the precise cause of action.

Therefore the first question to be answered is the questior#What is the wrong of which the plaintiff complains?"
The wromg is the violation of the right.

If the wrong

is the violation of several distinct rights it is still
but one cause of actiona for there is but a single wrong
But in performing a single act a person may become
guilty of a crime and a

tort Here thcre are two distinct

causes of action from a single act. The only general
rule which can be fo-mulated is that after examining the
rights and wrongs and the redress demandedvo

we find a

distinct line of demarkation between any parts of the
supposed cause of action it will be necessary to bring
two actions.
On the other hand a cause of action springing from a single transaction and of the same nature cannot be separated into two or more causes of action*Ail
damages arising from a single wrong although performed
at differgnt times make but a single cause of action*

( 19 Wend. 207*)So a runpng zzcaount under a contract is
but a single cause of action. This rule however must not
be interpreted to allow a contract and a tort action
united in the same action although they arise from the
same act performed by the

;ame party-.

The New York code peri.ts

a party to unite

in one pleading several causes of action where they all
arise out of the same express or implied contract. Under
the conmon law system it

was allowable

only to

unite

causes of action springing from similar contracts. This
was adopted entirely for the benefit

of the jurors.But

inasmuch as with the development of people3 and systems
of law the

individual also develops,it is in these later

days found to be unnecessary to make the restrictions
favoring the modern jury as strict as in former times.
Still it is necessary to limit the cause of actiont for
it is a sad truth that the brain of the modern juror
is as yet by no means in a perfect state of development4
The classes of wrongs which may be united in
a single action are ,
For personal injury

( with few exceptions).

Libel and Slander.
Injury to real property.
Ej e ctment,
Detention of chattels.
Causes connected with the spne transaction.
All

of these except the last are adopted from the sEaIme

considerations as the first,viz-in order to make it more
easy for the jury to understand.
The reply is a pleading which is served by

the plaintiff

after

receiving the defendants

answer

.In

the reply are concentrated all the functions of the several pleadings in the con-on law system. When a reply is
required

is

often a question. But the general rule seems

to be ,if the answer sets forth any new matter which,
if standing alone ,would constitute an affirmative cause
of action* it requires a reply. Any new matter alleged
in the answer which is
vcrting the

nly for the purpose of contro-

cause of action alleged in the complaint

does not require a reply. The law ss set forth in the
case'

is that only a counterclaim requires a reply but

the difficulty then presents itsoelf when we attempt to
answer the

question"What

is a counterclaim?". There are

also cases which declare that a set off does not requiea reply. This is correct if we accept the term set off
as designating only such claims as refer

either directly

or indirectly to the subject matter of the cause of action set forth in the complaint. But on the other handwe
accept

the term set off as designating a subdivision of

a counterclaimthese cases are not consistetnt with the
true theory of the reply.
The only ground for 4 demurrer which will

be

discussed here are
I

That there is another action pending between the part-

ies concerning the same cause of action,*

2, That the causes of action are improperly joined.
3, That the complaint does n~t contain facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action.
The ground first stated is one which would suggest itsself

at once to the student. The object of an action is

to give an irjurcd party a remedy for
that action

his wrong.When

is prosicuted to its end the remedy is en-

foreed an, the wrong is redressed or the right protected.W7hen this is accomplished the logical conclusion of
the law is that the grievance no longer exists. It would
therefore be folly to bring a second action

to= enforce

a remedy when there is no logical-y wrong to be redressed.
It

is

upon this

theory

the rzle of demurrer

which pro-

vides against Niatwo actions pending concerning

the same

wrong is placed. One of the actions will be sufficient
and the plaintiff is allo;ed but one.

It must be clearly

shown however that the parties are identical and that they
are

seeking the same remedy for the same wrong in both

cases.

The second ground for demurrer which we arc
to consider we have mentioned before. It is as we have
seen founded principally upon the prev~lJnt lack of
confidence in the average juror, Causes of action must

be similar

or connected with the smne

transaction in

order to go before the jury for decis~ion * This is
solely for the purp~ose of enabling the jurors to understand the issues and to permit them to congider the controvercy with more or less inteligince. In order to ascertain whether or not this objection

applies to a complaint

or an answer it is necessary for the party to examine
carefully the whole pleading.
The last ground which we may properly examine is

that the pleading does not contain facts suffic-

ient to constitute a cause of action.

This is simply a

denial of the implied proposition of law contained in the
pleading. It is an admission of all of the allegations
contained therein and an assertion that they do mot show
that the party has suffered any wrong. A party may demurp
to the whole of the complaint or to a single cause of action contained therein.
Whenever a demurrer is served the court will
examine all of the pleadings and set aside the first defective pleading- This rule was adopted to

induce care

on the part of all parties drawing up pleadings.

It is

almost the only safeguard against the inacuracy which
is too often found among those practicing in what are
known as code states.

What then is the philosophy of pleading? The philosophy
of code pleading is necess-'ryly the philosophy of all
pleading and of all law. The principals which underly
pleading are the source and foundation of all legal

phn-

yomena and practice. The law is developed and made identical with moral law

br the ever changing wants of

so-

ciety. It is by means of the wants of man that civilization becomes an entity in stead of a mere scheme. So it
is the requirements

of a people that

brings unto its

members a logical system of logical rules which are certai;i
reasonable, congistant with customs and innemorial.*The
greatest good to the gqatest number" was proclaimed by
the ancient philosophers to be both the great saurce and
end of all philosophy. Those philosophers were utilitarians.The philosophy of all law is cxjxK prinari~ly and

e
only utility. The crucial question then to be answerwd is
"71hat will result in the greatest good to the greatest
number?" 71hen that is answered we have the key to a
perfect system of law, and pleading. The early systems
contained all of the princip&

of' pleading relating to

the exposition of the issues but it was left for the
later legists in our modern codes to bring forward in an
immeasurably more efficient manner' the indispensable
factor of utility. "The stone which the builders refused

is become the head stone of the corner." The corner-stone
of a true system of pleading is and always must be SIMPLICITY,*

